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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXIV
and therefore will be denied. Thus, notwithstanding this
statute, the essence of Kelly - that the court's power to
grant payments from the estate of an incompetent is de-
pendent upon statutory delegation - remains. Clearly
then, a petition such as duPont, which is not within the
ambit of the statutory delegation of the power to apply
the substitution of judgment principal, would be rejected
by the Maryland courts.
In conclusion, the Whitbread principle provides the
court with the necessary latitude to deal fairly with the
estate of an incompetent. It is hoped that its increasing
acceptance, by either statutory or judicial adoption in the
American jurisdictions, will be coupled with a prudent
application, responsive both to the ward's probable wishes
and to those that have a bona fide claim in his estate.
STANLEY G. MAZAROFF
Sovereign Immunity Of Foreign Merchant Vessels
Flota Maritima Browning v. Motor Vessel Ciudad'
In a libel in rem against the vessel Ciudad de la Habana,
the libellant sought damages for the alleged breach of two
lease-purchase agreements. Prior to filing his suit, libellant
had notified the owner-lessor, a Cuban corporation, of the
alleged breaches and disclaimed any future responsibility
under the contracts. Thereafter, on June 5, 1959, the vessel
was sold to the Republic of Cuba, and the shipping agent
who was in control of the vessel was notified by the Cuban
corporation that he was henceforth to act as agent for the
Cuban government.2 On June 22, 1959 the libel was brought
and the vessel was seized pursuant to that libel. On Octo-
ber 27, 1960 the Republic of Cuba entered its appearance
in the case, claimed ownership of the vessel, prayed to
defend and filed an answer but failed to raise the defense
of sovereign immunity. In fact, a plea of sovereign im-
munity was not filed until May 11, 1962.' In refusing to
1 The Daily Record, August 24, 1964, p. 2 (4th Cir. 1964).
'Ibid. The recognition and acceptance of Cuba's right of control and
ownership by the agent who was in control of the ship at the time it was
libelled was undoubtedly considered to be sufficient control under the rule
of the Navemar case, which required "actual possession by some act of
physical dominion or control in behalf of the Spanish Government . . . or
at least some recognition . . . that they were controlling the vessel and
crew in behalf of their government." (Emphasis added.) Compania
Espanola v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 75-76 (1938). See generally, infra
note 26 for cases applying this rule.
I The Daily Record, August 24, 1964, p. 2 (4th Cir. 1964). The State
Department made no suggestion with respect to sovereign immunity,
although requested to do so by representatives of the Republic of Cuba.
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recognize this defense, the district court held that the fail-
ure to make a timely assertion of such immunity prior to
the merits being placed in issue constituted a waiver by the
Republic of Cuba of its right to claim such immunity.4 In
the principal case, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the district court.
Although the majority did not reach the substantive
issue of sovereign immunity, it suggested that the principle
of immunity applicable to foreign vessels under United
States foreign relations law is that principle known as
"restrictive" or "relative" sovereign immunity, a principle
"which has not been, but in time probably will be, adopted
by the Courts of the United States."5 Under the "restric-
tive" doctrine, a distinction usually is made between pri-
vate-commercial activities (jure qestionis) and public ac-
tivities (jure imperii). Immunity from jurisdiction of for-
eign courts is preserved in the case of state-owned and
state-operated vessels engaged in non-commercial and gov-
ernmental activities, while state-owned and state-operated
ships engaged in commercial, non-governmental activities
are treated in the same manner as are ordinary private-
commercial vessels and are not granted immunity.'
Despite the contention of the majority that the doctrine
of "absolute sovereign immunity" is no longer applicable
to merchant vessels under United States law, the dissent
argued that the "absolute" doctrine is still the law as
4 218 F. Supp. 938, 943-4 (D. Md. 1963). The district court quoted as
support for the holding, RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN REIAnoNs LAW OF THE
UNITED STATEs § 74 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
5 The Daily Record, August 24, 1964, p. 2, n. 10 (4th Cir. 1964). The
court therein referred to the RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 72, which states
in pertinent part:
"The immunity . . . does not apply to proceedings arising out of
commercial activities that the state carries on outside its own
territory."
' One of the clearest pronouncements of the restrictive doctrine as
applied to government vessels is to be found in the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Concerning the Immunity of State-owned
Vessels generally referred to as the Brussels Convention of 1926. Article I
provides:
"Seagoing vessels owned or operated by States, cargoes owned by
them, and cargoes and passengers carried on Government vessels, and
the States owning or carried on Government vessels, and the States
owning or operating such vessels, or owning such cargoes, are subject
in respect of claims relating to the operation of such vessels or the car-
riage of such cargoes, to the same rules of liability and to the same obli-
gations as those applicable to private vessels, cargoes and equipments."
Article 2 provides that the same legal rules and procedures are available
as in the case of privately owned vessels.
Article 3 draws the pertinent distinction as to governmental activities.
"The provisions of the two preceding Articles shall not be applicable
to ships of war, Government yachts . . . and other craft owned or
operated by a State, and used at the time a cause of action arises
exclusively on Governmental and non-commercial service, and such
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enunciated by the Supreme Court and should, therefore,
have been applied in the instant case.7 This division of opin-
ion is indicative of the unsettled status of the United States
law applicable to jurisdictional immunities of vessels.8 The
doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity9 was established
in American law 0 by Chief Justice Marshall in the classic
opinion of The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon," where
the Court held that an armed ship of France, which was
under the immediate and direct control of the sovereign
and employed by him in national objectives, was exempt
from the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign, the United
States. 2 The Chief Justice stated the doctrine in these
terms:
"[Flull and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike
the attribute of every sovereign, and being incapable of
conferring extra-territorial power, would not seem to
contemplate foreign sovereigns, nor their sovereign
rights, as its objects. One sovereign being in no respect
amenable to another; and being bound by obligations
of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of
his nation, by placing himself or its sovereign rights
within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to
enter a foreign territory only under an express license,
or in the confidence that the immunities belonging to
his independent sovereign station, though not expressly
stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be ex-
tended to him.
vessels shall not be subject to seizure, attachment or detention by any
legal process, nor to judicial proceedings in rem." II HACKWORTkH,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 463-64 (1940).
See generally, Harvard Research in International Law - Draft Conven-
tion, Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States, 26 Am. J. Int'l. L.
451 (Supp. 1932).
7 The Daily Record, August 24, 1964, p. 2, cols. 5-6 (4th Cir. 1964).
a SUCHARrIKUL, STATE IMMUNITIES AND TRADING AcTVTIEs IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 71-81, 182-202 (1959); see Lauterpacht, The Problem of
Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 Brit. Yb. Int'l. L. 220,
Appendix (1951).
9The doctrine of jurisdictional immunities of foreign vessels is based
essentially on state sovereignty, a dominant principle of public international
law; therefore, the question of state immunity in relation to vessels is
also a legitimate subject of international law. SUCHARITKUL, op. cit. supra
note 8, at XV.
10 International law is a part of the law of the land and will be applied
by the courts of the United States. BIsHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 65-8
(1953). But, such decisions as to immunity are evidence of international
law but are not international law itself. Timberg, Sovereign Immunity,
State Trading, Socialism and Self-Deception, 56 Nw. U.L. Ruv. 109, 117(1961).
li11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 74 (1812).2 Id. at 147.
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"This perfect equality and absolute independence of
sovereigns, and this common interest impelling them
to mutual intercourse, and an interchange of good
offices with each other, have given rise to a class of
cases in which every sovereign is understood to waive
the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive ter-
ritorial jurisdiction, which has been stated to be the
attribute of every nation."'8
In 1926, in Berizzi Bros. v. S.S. Pesaro," the Supreme
Court faced for the first time the issue whether a merchant
vessel owned, possessed and operated by a foreign sover-
eign in the carriage of merchandise for hire was immune
from arrest upon a libel in rem. The libel was filed against
the steamship Pesaro for damages arising from failure to
deliver certain silk accepted by her at Italy. Recognizing
that the Exchange decision did not apply to merchant ves-
sels, the Court went on to hold that the principles of im-
munity which were enunciated in that decision were per-
tinent to the Berizzi case. The Court, by Justice Van De-
vanter, stated:
"We think the principles are applicable alike to all
ships held and used by a government for a public pur-
pose, and that when, for the purpose of advancing the
trade of its people or providing revenue for its treasury,
a government acquires, mans and operates ships in
the carrying trade, they are public ships in the same
sense that war ships are. We know of no international
usage which regards the maintenance and advancement
of the economic welfare of a people in time of peace
as any less a public purpose than the maintenance and
training of a naval force. ' '' 5
By applying the doctrine of absolute immunity to a
government-owned merchant vessel the Court rejected an
earlier well-considered lower court decision, on the same
1Id. at 137. But see Lauterpacht, supra note 9, at 229:
"lit is doubtful whether that decision can accurately be quoted as
an authority in favour of the rigid principle of jurisdictional im-
munity of foreign states. It is cloar from the language of that decision
that the governing, the basic, principal is not the immunity of the
foreign state but the full jurisdiction of the territorial state and that
any immuni'ty of the foreign state must be traced to a waiver -
express or implied - of its jurisdiction on the part 'of the territorial
state. Any derogation from that jurisdiction is an impairment of the
sovereignty of the territorial state and must not readily be assumed."
"271 U.S. 562 (1926).
"Id. at 574. (Emphasis added.) The use of the term "public purpose"
by the Court does not here refer to the distinction made under the restric-
tive immunity doctrine. Here the Court is concerned with ends of govern-
mental activity rather than with the activity itself (whether it is com-
mercial or non-commercial).
1964] 343
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facts, which applied the restrictive doctrine.16 In that case,
The Pesaro, the lower court was of the opinion that
"[A] government ship should not be immune from
seizure as such, but only by reason of the nature of
the service in which she is engaged.
"And as the Pesaro was employed as an ordinary mer-
chant vessel for commercial purposes at a time when
no emergency existed or was declared, she should not
be immune from arrest in admiralty, especially as no
exemption has been claimed for her, by reason of her
sovereign or political character, through the official
channels of the United States.11 7
Prior to the Berizzi decision, sovereign immunity gen-
erally had been granted to merchant vessels on the basis of
international comity.'5 And, both before and after Berizzi,
the requirement of devotion of the vessel to a public pur-
pose was recognized. 9 The courts, however, in order to
limit the doctrine of absolute immunity, required, as evi-
dence of the ship's being operated by the state for public
purposes, that the ship be either owned and possessed or
merely possessed and controlled or managed by the foreign
government.2" This requirement was based upon the con-
16 The Pesaro, 277 Fed. 473 (S.D. N.Y. 1921), rev'd on other grounds,
255 U.S. 216 (1921). This case dealt with the same subject matter as the
Berizzi case, 271 U.S. 562 (1926), but was dismissed when the court vacated
the arrest by consent of the parties because of incorrect procedure in
claiming immunity. A new suit was instituted giving rise to the Berizzi
decision.
17 277 Fed. 473, 482 (S.D. N.Y. 1921). The court here makes a distinction
between "immunity" and "exemption". For such distinction see BisHop,
OP. cit. supra note 9, at 417:
"In considering these immunities, it is frequently desirable to dis-
tinguish between immunity from jurisdiction (in the sense that the
foreign state or its representative cannot be made an unwilling party
defendant), and exemption from the application of the law (in the
sense that the territorial law does not apply to the acts of the agency
claiming exemption, even . . . after the expiration of the immunity
from jurisdiction or its waiver)."
1 The Adriatic, 258 Fed. 902, 904 (3d Cir. 1919) ; The Augustine, 8 F.
2d 287, 289 (S.D. N.Y. 1924) ; The Luigi, 230 Fed. 493, 496 (E.D. Pa. 1916).
These cases dealt with suits against private merchant vessels requisitioned
by foreign governments. In The Athanasios, 228 Fed. 558, 560 (S.D. N.Y.
1915) the court declined jurisdiction for political reasons.
19Oompania Espanola v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 74 (1938); The
Roseric, 254 Fed. 154, 161-62 (D. N.J. 1918) :
"[I]t is not the ownership or exclusive possession of the instrumen-
tality by the sovereign, but its appropriation and devotion to such
service, that exempts it from judicial process."
20 The Carlo Poma, 259 Fed. 369 (2d Cir. 1919), decree vacated, 255 U.S.
219 (1921); The Uxmal, 40 F. Supp. 258 (D. Mass. 1941); The Pampa,
245 Fed. 137 (E.D. N.Y. 1917); The Johnson Lighterage Co. No. 24, 231
Fed. 365 (D. N.J. 1916). A hint of the application of the restrictive doc-
trine arose in The Beaten Park, 65 F. Supp. 211, 212 (W.D. Wash. 1946),
where the court said: "[I]t was not a government function that was being
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cept that the property becomes a part of the sovereign, not
because it is owned by the sovereign, but because it is
devoted to public use and employed in carrying on the
operations of government.21 It follows that a privately
owned vessel employed by a foreign government for public
purposes enjoys the same immunity as state-owned ships
used in public service.22 And, therefore, the Supreme Court
in Compania Espanola v. Navemar,2 3 established actual pos-
session and not ownership as the real test of immunity.24
The Supreme Court, declaring that the want of admiralty
jurisdiction and the right of the Spanish Government to
demand possession of a vessel were appropriate subjects
for judicial inquiry, held:
"The decree of attachment, without more, did not
operate to change the possession which, before the de-
cree, was admittedly in petitioner. To accomplish that
result, since the decree was in invitum, actual posses-
sion by some act of physical dominion or control in
behalf of the Spanish Government, was needful, ....
or at least some recognition on the part of the ship's
officers that they were controlling the vessel and crew
in behalf of their government."2 5
A further limitation of claims of immunity has been
accomplished by restricting the procedures available for
claiming such immunity. One usual procedure is for a
recognized and authorized representative of a country to
make a special appearance for the purpose of claiming
immunity.26 The more recognized method of asserting im-
pursued. It was merely an ordinary commercial operation of a merchant
ship owned but not possessed or operalted by the foreign government." Thus
the Court ultimately relied upon the possession test. See also Note,
Immunity from Suit of Foreign Sovereign Instrumentalities and Obliga-
tions, 50 YALE L.J. 1088, 1089 (1941).
21 The Fidelity, 8 Fed. Cas. 1189, 1191 (No. 4,758) (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1879);
The Uxm'al, s upra note 20, at 261.
.2 The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419 (1922).
23 303 U.S. 68 (1938).
24 See generally Yokohama Specie Bank, Ltd. v. Cheng T. Wang, 113 F.
2d 329 (9th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 690 (1940) ; Ervin v. Quin-
tanilla, 99 F. 2d 935 (5th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 635 (1939) ; The
Katingo Hadjipatera, 40 F. Supp. 546 (S.D. N.Y. 1941), aff'd, 119 F. 2d 1022
(2d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 593 (1941).
21 Compania Espanola v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 75-6 (1938) ; The
Baja California, 45 F. Supp. 519 (S.D. Cal. 1942), aff'd sub nom, Republic
of Mexico v. Hoffman, 143 F. 2d 854 (9th Cir. 1944), aff d, 324 U.S. 30
(1.945); The Beaverton, 273 Fed. 539 (S.D. N.Y. 1919). A series of
requisition cases during World War II relied upon the rule of the Navemar
case. The Janko, 54 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. N.Y. 1944), supplemented, 54 F.
Supp. 241 (E.D. N.Y. 1944) ; The Ljubica Matkovic, 49 F. Supp. 936 (S.D.
N.Y. 1943) ; The Frederick, 43 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. N.Y. 1942).
21 Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 31 (1945); Compania
Espanola v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68, 74 (1938) ; Petrol Shipping Corp.
1964]
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munity - in fact the most prevalent method - is through
the Executive Department of the United States. The State
Department may suggest or present the claim of immunity
to the courts either on its own initiative or at the request
of a foreign government;27 such a suggestion is usually
made through the Attorney General. Through this method
of suggestion or "recognition and allowance" of a request
of immunity from a foreign government, the State Depart-
ment, in recent years, has played an influential role in the
development of the principle of restrictive immunity as
applied by the courts.
In 1921, the attitude of the State Department was ex-
pressed in a letter to Justice Mack concerning the Pesaro28
case:
"It is the view of the Department that government
owned merchant vessels or vessels under requisition of
governments whose flag they fly employed in commerce
should not be regarded as entitled to the immunities
accorded public vessels of war. The Department has
not claimed immunity for American vessels of this
character.... 29
Although the Supreme Court in the Berizzi ° case re-
jected the suggestion of the State Department that the re-
strictive doctrine be applied, the attitude of the Court in
recent years has been to follow the branch charged with
v. 'Kingdom of Greece, Ministry of Com., 326 F. 2d 117 (2d Cir. 1964);
Ervin v. Quintanilla, 99 F. 2d 935, 938 (5th Cir. 1938). See also The
Gul Diemal, 264 U.S. 90 (1924), where immunity was denied because
it was claimed by a diplomat %f another country; The Sao Vicenti, 281
Fed. 111 (2d Cir. 1922), cert. granted, 258 U.S. 614 (1922), cert. isMir8sed,
260 U.S. 151 (1922), where a consul general was held not competent to
raise a claim of immunity; The Secundus, 15 F. 2d 711 (E.D. N.Y. 1926),
where immunity was denied because the claim was presented by private
counsel.
27 SUCHARrTKUL, op. cit. Supra note 8, at 189-90. But see Maru Nay. Co.
v. Societa Com. Italiana Di Navigation, 271 Fed. 97 (D. Md. 1921). The
court refused immunity on the basis that no suggestion came through the
State Department although the Italian consul and ambassador made
separate suggestions of immunity.
28 The Pesaro, 277 Fed. 473 (S.D. N.Y. 1921).
209 1 HACKWORTH, op. cit. supra note 6, at 438-39. (Emphasis added.)
See also Secretary Lansing's letter of November 8, 1918: "[Wlhere (govern-
ment-owned) vessels were engaged in commercial pursuits, they should be
subject to the obligations and restrictions of trade, if they were to enjoy
its benefits and profits .... " II HACKWORTH, 8upra at 429-30.
As to immunity of American vessels see Suits in Admiralty Act, 41 Stat.
525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 741-52 (1958), providing for exemption of vessels
from arrest and seizure but allowing action in personam against the United
States where, if the ship were privately owned, a proceeding in admiralty
could be maintained. See also Public Vessels Act, 43 Stat. 1112 (1925),
46 U.S.C. §§ 781-799 (1958).30 Berizzi Bros. v. Steamship Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
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the conduct of foreign affairs. 1 The new attitude of the
Court was first reflected in Mexico v. Hoffman,8 2 where im-
munity was denied a merchant vessel which was under a
claim for ownership by the Mexican Government. The
Court stated:
"[I]t is an accepted rule of substantive law governing
the exercise of the jurisdiction of the courts that they
accept and follow the executive determination that the
vessel shall be treated as immune. (citation omitted.)
But recognition by the courts of an immunity upon
principles which the political department of govern-
ment has not sanctioned may be equally embarrassing
to it in securing the protection of our national interests
and their recognition by other nations." 3
According to this dictum the courts would be obligated to
follow the restrictive doctrine as advocated by the State
Department in its suggestions; yet the Court refused to
expressly overrule Berizzi3 4
In May, 1952 after a comprehensive study of the appli-
cation of the restrictive doctrine by other states, Jack B.
Tate, Acting Legal Advisor to the State Department, ad-
vised acting Attorney General Perlman that the State De-
partment would continue to follow the restrictive doctrine
in recognizing and allowing suggestions of immunity from
suit in certain cases."5 Up to the present, however, there
have been no cases decided by the Supreme Court clearly
31 Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated One of Its Functions?,
40 AM. J. INT'L. L. 168 (1946).
82324 U.S. 30 (1945).
88Id. at 36. See Ew parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943), where a certifi-
cation showing that a suggestion of immunity by the Republic of Peru had
been "recognized and allowed", the court granted sovereign immunity with-
out question. "The certification and request that the vessel be declared
immune must be accepted by the courts as a conclusive determination by
the political arm of the Government that the continued retention of the
vessel interferes with the proper conduct of our foreign relations." See
also Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va. 1961),
aff'd, 295 F. 2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961). This case held thtat "recognition and
allowance" of immunity was conclusive upon the court despite the un-
qualified waiver of such immunity prior to such State Department action.
The Beaton Park, 65 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Wash. 1946) ; The Maliakos, 41 F.
Supp. 697 (S.D. N.Y. 1941).
1, In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter called for the overruling
of Berizzi in light of the changes in the economic activities of states since
that decision and attacked the majority opinion because of their depend-
ence upon the possession test to determine immunity, Republic of Mexico
v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 38 et seq. (1945).
35 26 Dep't of State Bull. 984 (1952). See generally Setser, The Immuni-
ties of the State and Government Economic Activities, 24 LAw & CoNrnap.
PROB. 291, 307-16 (1959); Bishop, New United States Policy Limiting
Sovereign Immunity, 47 AM. J. INT'L. L. 93 (1953). As to the statistical
study underlying this pronouncement see Timberg, supra note 11, at 117-19.
1964] 347
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establishing the restrictive doctrine as the policy to be
followed by the courts,36 in relation to state-owned and
state-operated merchant vessels.
The courts tend to follow the suggestion of the State
Department;37 however, while the State Department ap-
proves of the application of the restrictive doctrine in
appropriate cases, the Department itself may not apply
it where it would be politically inexpedient to do so. 8
Because diplomatic and political considerations, rather than
a determination of whether a governmental activity in-
volved is commercial or non-commercial, are often the de-
termining factors in a decision by the State Department
to grant or withhold a suggestion of immunity, their sug-
gestions often appear to be inconsistent with their stated
policy of application of the restrictive doctrine. 9 The
courts, therefore, have been reluctant to adopt the restric-
tive doctrine as an invariable policy despite indications in
recent cases that the courts are willing to apply the doc-
trine in appropriate cases.4"
The State Department has thus far applied the doctrine
of relative immunity only to "immunity from jurisdiction";
the immunity of the foreign agency or corporation from
execution is still considered, by the State Department, to
be absolute.4' In 1959 a letter was sent by the Legal Advisor
of the State Department to the Attorney General concern-
ing the case of Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank :412
"The Department has always recognized the dis-
tinction between 'immunity from jurisdiction' and 'im-
munity from execution'. The Department has main-
tained the view that under international law property
36 Setser. supra note 35, at 314.
37 Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35-6 (1945); Eo parte
Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 587 (1943).
11 For discussion of the non-conformity of the State Department with the
announced restrictive doctrine see Comment, International Law - Sover-
eign Immunity - The First Decade of the Tate Letter Policy, 60 Micu. L.
REv. 1142 (1962) ; Drachsler, Some Observations on the Current Status
of the Tate Letter, 54 Amr. J. INT'L. L. 790 (1960).
39 E.g., Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 197 F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va. 1961);
New York & Cusba M.S.S. Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684,
685-6 (S.D. N.Y. 1955) ; Wolchok v. Statni Banka Ceskoslovenslka, 12 N.Y.
2d 784, 235 N.Y.S. 2d 3 (Ct. of App. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 828 (1963).
40 National 'Bank v. Republic tof China, 348 U.S. 356, 358 (1955). Republic
of Iraq v. First National City Trust Co., 207 F. Supp. 588, 590 (S.D. N.Y.
1962), appeal dismissed, 313 F. 2d 194 (1963). See Three Stars Trading
Co. v. Republic of Cuba, 222 N.Y.S. 2d 675 (Sup. Ct. 1961). The court held,
upon 'the basis of the restrictive doctrine, that the foreign sovereign's
instrumentality was not immune from attachment.
,1 Secretary Rusk's News Conference, 45 STATE DEPT. BULL. 277-S (Aug.
14, 1961).
4'21 MisC. 2d 1086, 192 N.Y.S. 2d 469 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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of a foreign sovereign is immune from execution to
satisfy even a judgment obtained in an action against
a foreign sovereign where there is no immunity from
suit."43
However, the court in the principal case, apparently recog-
nizing the frustration of justice which may result from such
a distinction, stated that the waiver of sovereign immunity
in the present case constituted a waiver of jurisdiction-
immunity as well as execution immunity.44 The dissent
argued that waiver of jurisdiction-immunity does not also
constitute waiver of execution immunity; that since execu-
tion means the sale of the property and the sale is not
effected by arrest or attachment, the two should not be
equated; and that "satisfaction of the adjudication" should
be left to "the channels of diplomacy."45
The restrictive doctrine has been criticized by Professor
Lauterpacht. He contends that the various nice distinctions
which are made by the courts, in attempting to apply the
doctrine, have infused an element of artificiality into in-
ternational law; that a disproportionate amount of the
courts' time is required to determine a relatively insignifi-
cant issue; and that there are no established rules that can
be generally applicated to aid the courts in making the dis-
tinctions between commercial and non-commercial uses
required under the doctrine.46
Despite these criticisms, the restrictive doctrine is to be
preferred to the doctrine of absolute immunity which is
archaic with respect to contemporary governmental eco-
nomic realities.4 7 As was stated by Judge Haynsworth in
a footnote to the principal case:
"When nations throughout the world began to par-
ticipate directly in international commerce, reconsid-
eration of the absolute theory of sovereign immunity
became appropriate. Appropriateness became compel-
ling when some countries became state traders, engag-
ing, exclusively, or nearly so, . . .in the international
1354 AM. J. INT'L. L. 640, 643 (1960), citing as authority Dexter and
Carpenter, Inc. v. iKunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43 F. 2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930)
and Bradford v. Chase National Bank, 24 F. Supp. 28 (S.D. N.Y. 1938).
44 The Daily Record, August 24, 1964, p. 2, cols. 3-4 (4th Cir. 1964).
41 The Daily Record, August 24, 1964, p. 2, col. 7 (4th Cir. 1964).
46 Lauterpach t, supra note 9, at 236-50. The author discusses the rela-
tive merits of "absolute" and "restrictive" immunity doctrines but sug-
gests as a third and preferred alternative, the assimilation of the foreign
sovereign to the position of the territorial sovereign in relation to the
privileges and liabilities of its instrumentalities. But see Lillich, The
Geneva Conference an the Law of the Sea and the Immunity of Foreign
State-Owned Commercial Vessels, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 408, 418-19 (1960).
47 RESTATEMENT, supra note 4, § 75 and comments.
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carriage of goods and trade, which, in other countries,
is left largely to private citizens or companies."48
In the completely socialized countries of eastern Europe,
the state trading enterprises are the exclusive vehicles of
international trade; and in the world's underdeveloped
nations, state trading enterprises are the dominant instru-
mentalities of international commerce.4 9 Therefore, a priv-
ate individual dealing with these agencies would forfeit
his judicial remedies for wrongs committed by that agency,
which remedies would be available to him against a private
person who had undertaken the same type enterprise as
that undertaken by the state agency and had committed a
similar wrong. Thus, the absolute doctrine, when applied
to contemporary economic circumstances, breeds injustice
and inequality before the law.50 Furthermore, the doctrine
is contrary to the wider principle which postulates the sub-
mission of the instrumentalities of a sovereign to the opera-
tion of law as administered by the states.5 However, if
the restrictive doctrine is accepted as the policy of the
United States, it should be considered as a substantive legal
question, having its foundation in international law; and
unless political and diplomatic considerations require the
State Department to issue a suggestion of immunity, such
question should be determined by that branch most com-
petent in treating such issues, the Judiciary. "[F]or that
doctrine [restrictive] calls for the essentially judicial proc-
ess of applying a legal rule to a given set of facts, resulting
in an international law decision, and is not governed byforeign relations considerations. '5 2
BARBARA SPICER
,8 The Daily Record, August 24, 1964, p. 2, n. 10 (4th Cir. 1964).
,9 Timberg, supra note 10, at 111-13.50 Lauterpacht, supra note 9, at 220.
51 Supra at 237.
52 Timberg, supra note 11, at 115. The Supreme Court has recently stated:
"[I]ts [the doctrine] continuing vitality depends on its capacity to
reflect the proper distribution of functions between the judicial and
political branches of the Government on matters bearing upon foreign
,affairs. It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codifica-
tion or consensus concerning a particular area of international law,
the more 'appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regard-
ing it, since the courts can then focus on the application of an agreed
principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the sensitive task
of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national interest
or with international justice. It is also evident that some aspects
of international law touch much more sharply on national nerves than
do others; the less important the implications of an issue are for 'our
foreign relations, the weaker the justification for exclusivity in the
political branches."
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427-28 (1964). Although
the Court is speaking of the "act of state" doctrine, the principle is equally
applicable to the restrictive doctrine 'of sovereign immunity and to some
extent explains the courts' reluctance to treat the question of immunity
as a purely judicial question.
